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War and famine in Ethiopia 1982-5
It is a commonplace that the great 
famine in Ethiopia during 1982-5 was 
caused as much by war as by natural 
adversity. It was the result of specific- 
war strategies undertaken by the 
former government against the Tigray- 
an People's Liberation Front (TPLF).
The most obvious were the huge and 
devastating army counter offensives into the 
TPLF heartland, using up to 80,000 troops 
on each occasion. There were major offen­
sives in 1980-1, 1983 and 1985. The 
‘seventh offensive’ o f February-May 1983 
struck into the key grain-producing districts 
o f western Tigray; it is from the launch of 
this attack that the onset o f the famine can 
be dated, to the week.
However, the general counter-insurgency 
strategies implemented from 1980 onwards 
had an equally profound, though more 
insidious effect. The strategies were:
1. The bombing o f marketplaces in rebel- 
held areas. Markets had to be held at night, 
which caused a dramatic down-turn in 
trading activity.
2. Restrictions on the private grain trade. 
The government harassed and detained 
grain traders using pack animals. This pre­
vented the movement o f surplus grain out 
o f Raya (eastern Tigray), northern Gonder, 
and central Wollo in 1983-4.
3. Restrictions on migrant labour. Migrant 
labour was formerly a major source of 
income for poor people in northern 
Ethiopia. Government harassment virtually 
prevented this in the early 1980s. As these
The tide of war is ebbing in at least 
parts of SSA, but if emergency pro­
grammes are closed down in these 
areas, we may replicate - this time for 
human beings - the pattern of live­
stock losses from droughts. In 
Somalia, over half livestock losses 
occurred after drought had broken 
because five simple, well-known 
veterinary drugs were not available. 
Their supply was somehow viewed 
neither as ‘emergency’ nor as 
‘development’ assistance.
Only by recognising that calamity does not 
cease until livelihoods are restored can 
further loss o f human life be averted. The 
means to achieve this are:
1. Reprogramming emergency operations 
to include livelihood rehabilitation.
2. Recognising the need for flexibility in 
the location o f support operations. Dislo­
cated persons and refugees are usually 
determined to go home as soon as poss­
ible. Their food and water needs cannot 
be deferred to fit a critical path project 
timetable or bureaucratic convenience.
3. Acting with utmost speed to articulate 
and implement operations.
4. Keeping costs per household served 
low by minimising ‘high level’ personnel 
requirements.
strategies were introduced, widened and in­
tensified, the famine began and then 
deepened. Large areas o f southern and 
eastern Tigray are chronically in food defi­
cit; the fighting and restrictions meant that 
the inhabitants were unable to follow their 
coping strategies to obtain money or food.
Measures one and two destroyed any 
spatial integration in the grain market: har­
vests literally rotted in surplus areas, while 
deficit areas had their problems greatly 
exaggerated. The price o f grain in Mekele, 
capital o f Tigray, shot up in November 
1982, to 165 Ethiopian Birr per 100 kg sack 
— nearly twice what would have been 
expected if transport had been possible 
from nearby surplus-producing areas.
Measure three meant that while farmers in 
coffee producing areas o f southern Ethiopia 
and grain surplus areas o f Gonder and 
western Tigray suffered labour shortages, 
deficit areas on the eastern escarpment o f 
the highlands had large unemployed popu­
lations. When the seventh offensive 
destroyed employment opportunities in 
Tigray in March 1983, the labourers who 
had managed to reach the area trekked 
back to relief shelters at Korem and Ibnat. 
They formed the destitute populations who 
were the basis o f the first appeals by Oxfam 
and Save the Children Fund.
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5. Identifying and accepting the priorities 
o f returning and pauperised, in-place rural 
households which typically include: 
secure land use access; provision o f food 
until harvest (9 to 15 months) - there are 
few instant crops’ and even fewer house­
hold food reserves; distribution o f clear­
ing, building and tilling tools plus seeds 
and basic household kits (e.g. water pails, 
to save time); restoration o f small to 
medium rural commercial networks; rapid, 
phased restoration o f primary health, 
water and education access; and labour 
intensive, seasonal projects earning cash 
income for households until they have 
crops, livestock or fish to sell.
Unless this kind o f approach is adopted 
there will be more deaths and more 
pauperisation, through institutional and 
imagination failure to provide a minimum 
enabling contexi.
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later years o f the conflict that both enabled 
soldiers and officials to create safe and 
functioning administrations, and provided 
the essential kick-start to the economy. 
Should agencies have been prepared to 
support the state and businesses directly?
The lesson from these experiences is that 
relief agencies cannot presume to a 
humanitarian detachment. They have to 
operate within the processes o f the war 
situation. Whilst much can be done by 
protecting people from abuse, this cannot 
on its own be enough.
The various contributions to this issue of 
Development Research Insights elaborate 
and extend different facets o f this analysis. 
Borton quantifies the rapid increase in the 
level o f involvement o f NGOs in relief 
operations. He focuses on UK aid but the 
situation is similar among other donors. It 
seems to reflect the (perhaps misguided) 
emphasis on speedy, accountable delivery 
o f relief to civilian victims, rather than to 
addressing, as far as is possible, the prior 
problems which result in the emergence of 
extractive, militaristic structures. Hampson 
describes the legal framework applicable 
to relief operations. She suggests that there 
is greater scope for NGOs, even within 
existing mechanisms, to bring external 
pressure to bear on combatant forces, 
though it remains to be seen whether long 
term benefits will accrue in Africa from 
enforcing international law through 
military intervention. Yet relief agencies 
did make a very real contribution to the 
resolution o f the Mozambique conflict, 
though indirectly. De Waal's description of 
the military strategy action o f the Ethiopian 
government in 1982-1985 documents how 
the basis o f livelihoods can be deliberately 
destroyed by the state. Relief agencies 
need to monitor and respond to such acts 
as the bombing o f market places and the 
restriction o f trade and population 
movements, by both state and rebel forces.
Meanwhile Green focusses our attention 
on post-war situations, suggesting strat­
egies for more effective assistance to the 
reconstruction o f livelihoods and basic 
services in the decimated war zones and 
for returning refugees. Buchanan-Smith, 
Davies and Petty and Maxwell describe 
recent thinking on famine early warning 
systems and on the developmental uses of 
food aid for famine prevention. While both 
these aid instruments have undergone 
considerable technical improvement and 
refinement in recent years, difficulties 
remain in their application in conflict 
situations. Their adaptation to conflict 
situations requires careful consideration of 
the political economy o f war and its 
impact on livelihoods, and the nature of 
and opportunities for external intervention.
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